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NOTE
Suffrage for People with Intellectual Disabilities and Mental
Illness: Observations on a Civic Controversy
Charles Kopel*
Abstract:
Most electoral democracies, including forty-three states in the United States,
deny people the right to vote on the basis of intellectual disability or mental
illness. Scholars in several fields have addressed these disenfranchisements,
including legal scholars who analyze their validity under U.S. constitutional law
and international-human-rights law, philosophers and political scientists who
analyze their validity under democratic theory, and mental-health researchers
who analyze their relationship to scientific categories. This Note reviews the
current state of the debate across these fields and makes three contentions: (a)
pragmatic political considerations have blurred the distinction between
disenfranchisement provisions based on cognitive capacity and those based on
personal status; (b) proposals that advocate voting by proxy trivialize the broad
civic purpose of the franchise; and (c) the persistence of disenfranchisement on
the basis of mental illness inevitably contributes to silencing socially disfavored
views and lifestyles. Accordingly, the Note cautions reformers against
advocating for capacity assessment or proxy voting, and emphasizes the
importance of disassociating the idea of mental illness from voting capacity.
* New York University Law School, J.D. expected 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
The majority of electoral democracies deny people the right to vote on the
basis of intellectual disability or mental illness. A 2014 study of ninety-one
democracies found that only sixteen maintain no suffrage restrictions for
intellectual disability, while the seventy-five others maintain at least some
restrictions.' Of the latter group, seventy-three states disenfranchise people by
reference to certain statuses (e.g., retardation, legal incapacitation, guardianship,
or detention in a psychiatric ward); and two states disenfranchise people using a
more functional standard based on an individual's lack of capacity to understand
the voting process, however they lack a defined procedure for ascertaining
capacity. 2
A 2016 study focusing on disenfranchisement of people with mental illness
surveyed all 193 member states of the United Nations. 3 Its authors found that
twenty-one states maintain no suffrage restrictions for mental illness, sixty-nine.,
states disenfranchise all people "with any mental health problems ... without any
qualifier,"' nine states disenfranchise people detained under mental-health laws,'
and fifty-six states authorize courts or magistrates to disenfranchise people for
mental-health reasons.6
In the United States, where most voting qualifications are determined at the
state level,' only eleven states maintain no suffrage restrictions on the basis of
1. Ludvig Beckman, The Accuracy ofElectoral Regulations: The Case of the Right to Vote by
People with Cognitive Impairments, 13 Soc. POL'Y & Soc'v 221, 222-26 (2014). Beckman's study
sample included democratic states with a population of at least one million people, identified by the
author as "all major 'electoral democracies' in the world as of 2006." Guinea Bissau also meets the
qualifications of population and democracy, but no data was available as to its suffrage restrictions.
The sixteen nations without restrictions are Austria, Canada, Bolivia, Croatia, Ecuador, Finland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
2. Id. at 226.
3. Dinesh Bhugra et al., Mental Illness and the Right to Vote: A Review of Legislation Across
the World, 28 INT'L REV. PSYCHIATRY 395 (2016).
4. Id. at 396.
5. Id. at 396-97 (noting that twelve other states disenfranchise all detained people, a group
that presumably includes people detained for mental-health reasons but does not target them
specifically).
6. Id. "Of the remaining, [the authors] had little or no information about the legal provisions
with respect to right to vote for persons with mental illness in 24 Member States and legislative
provisions were unclear in two Member States." Id. at 396.
7. Under U.S. law, states retain the power to regulate access to the franchise. Lassiter v.
Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959) (upholding electoral literacy tests
under the states' "broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may
be exercised"). For more on Lassiter and its importance in the evolution of access to the franchise,
see Part II.A below. Despite the states' general powers in this realm, the U.S. Constitution forbids
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intellectual disability or mental illness.8 Twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia disenfranchise people found by a court to lack capacity to vote, 9 ten
states and Puerto Rico disenfranchise any people "under guardianship,"" three
states disenfranchise people considered non compos mentis," and Montana
disenfranchises people "adjudicated to be of unsound mind ... unless the person
has been restored to capacity as provided by law." 2
Despite their ubiquity, suffrage restrictions based on intellectual disability
and mental illness are controversial. This Note briefly sketches the current state
of the controversy and advances three defined claims. Part I introduces the
structure and terminology of the Note. Part II reviews criticisms of existing
suffrage restrictions from the perspectives of U.S. law, international-human-
rights law, and democratic theory. Part III criticizes the proposed shift to
capacity-based -restrictions, arguing that pragmatic political considerations have
blurred the distinction between voting capacity and mental impairment status.
disenfranchisement on the basis of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1, on the basis of sex, id. amend. XIX, or on the basis of age for citizens who are
"eighteen years of age or older," id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
8. VOTE. It's Your Right: A Guide to the Voting Rights of People with Mental Disabilities,
BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW ET AL., 13 (2016), http://www.bazelon.org/portals
/0/voting/voting%20rights%20guide%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MPQ-SGPG] [hereinafter
BAZELON CTR.]. The eleven states with no restrictions are Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
9. Id. The twenty-five states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
10. Id. at 12. Typically, people are placed under guardianship by court order for reasons
incompetence or incapacity, but not specifically related to voting capacity. The ten states are
Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. In some states, the restrictions have been interpreted to avoid any
unconstitutional restrictions on the ability to vote. Id.
11. Id. at 13. The three states are Mississippi, Nebraska, and Rhode Island. The Rhode Island
Constitution and the Mississippi statute both require a specific adjudication of non compos mentis
status, but neither one defines the term. R.I. CONsT. art. 2, § 1; Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11 (2016).
Nebraska law defines non compos mentis as "mentally incompetent." NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-312
(2016). While the Hawaii Constitution also prohibits individuals who are non compos mentis from
voting, HAw. CONST. art. 2, § 2, the relevant statute requires a specific finding that the person is
"incapacitated to the extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning voting," HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-23(a) (2016).
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-111(3) (2015). For a detailed chart of all the states' and
territories' relevant constitutional and statutory language, see BAZELON CTR., supra note 8, at 28-
52. For a historical overview of the evolution of U.S. state law on the voting rights of people with
mental impairments, see Kay Schriner et al., Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting
Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 437
(2000); Benjamin 0. Hoemer, Note, Unfulfilled Promise: Voting Rights for People with Mental
Disabilities and the Halving of HAVA's Potential, 20 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 89, 107-16 (2015);
Ryan Kelley, Note, Toward an Unconditional Right to Vote for Persons with Mental Disabilities:
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Part IV criticizes the proposition of proxy voting, arguing that it trivializes the
broad purposes of voting. Finally, Part V analyzes the concept of mental illness,
and advocates disassociating mental illness and voting capacity. I argue that
disenfranchising people on the basis of mental illness per se necessarily
contributes to silencing socially disfavored views and lifestyles.
In the academic literature on the legitimacy of suffrage restrictions,
"cognitive impairment," "intellectual disability," and "intellectual impairment"
are often used interchangeably.' 3 This leads to considerable confusion, because
U.S. law draws fine distinctions among these terms.' 4 For the sake of clarity, this
Note will refer to all of these conditions as "intellectual disabilities," and to the
collective category of intellectual disabilities and mental illnesses as "mental
impairments."" In particular contexts, however, it will be necessary to
distinguish disability from illness, and "status-based restrictions" from "capacity-
based" ones.
This Note will not specifically address the implicit barriers to voting faced
by people with mental impairments, caused by a systemic deficit of awareness
and accommodation.16 Many other writers have addressed this form of
disenfranchisement," some arguing that it violates the fundamental suffrage right
protected under both U.S. and international law." This Note will also leave aside
13. See, e.g., Ludvig Beckman, Political Equality and the Disenfranchisement of People with
Intellectual Impairments, 6 Soc. POL'Y & Soc'Y 13 (2007) (using the terms "intellectual
impairments," "cognitive impairments," and "intellectual disabilities" alternately, in apparent
reference to the same conditions); Jason H. Karlawish et al., Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and
Social Issues Raised by Voting by Persons with Dementia, 292 JAMA 1345 (2004) (using the terms
"cognitive impairments" and "cognitive disabilities" alternately in apparent reference to the same
conditions).
14. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012)
(defining "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual").
15. See Civil Rights Div., ADA Basics: Statutes and Regulations, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 5
(2006), https://www.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/chapltoolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7MN-X32X] (listing
both "mental retardation" and "mental illness" as examples of "mental impairments").
16. Some examples of possible accommodations include designing ballot technology that does
not require fine-motor coordination and is not difficult to read, relaxing voting-booth time limits,
and providing direct assistance by polling-place staff in filling out registration forms. See Pamela S.
Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 MCGEORGE L.
REv. 917, 921-23 (2007) (elaborating on these possibilities and calling the implicit barriers to
voting "[a] far greater source of effective exclusion" than the explicit barriers).
17. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, 40
METAPHILOSOPHY 331 (2009); Lisa Schur et al., Enabling Democracy: Disability and Voter
Turnout, 55 POL. RES. Q. 167 (2002).
18. For claims regarding U.S. law, see, for example, Hoerner, supra note 12; Kelley, supra
note 12. For claims regarding international law, see, for example, JAnos Fiala-Butora et al., The
Democratic Life of the Union: Toward Equal Voting Participation for Europeans with Disabilities,
55 HARv. J. INT'L L. 71 (2014); Marcus Redley et al., The Voting Rights ofAdults with Intellectual
Disabilities: Reflections on the Arguments, and Situation in Kenya and England and Wales, 56 J.
INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 1026 (2012).
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the special issues raised by Alzheimer's disease and other forms of mental
impairment associated with aging--e.g. voting in long-term care facilities and the
possibility of disenfranchisement on the basis of advanced age-although that
topic is undoubtedly important and others have addressed it as well. " All the
legal and philosophical deliberations below apply with equal relevance to elderly
people but do not treat them as a distinct category. Rather, the analysis that
follows will focus squarely on the state of, and the theoretical legitimacy of,
existing laws that explicitly restrict suffrage on the basis of mental impairment.
I. CRITICISMS OF MENTAL-IMPAIRMENT-BASED SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS
A. United States Law
United States courts have considered the legality, under federal
constitutional and statutory law, of state disenfranchisement of people with
mental impairments. This section will first sketch the historical and doctrinal
background of this debate, and will then summarize two important twenty-first
century judicial decisions. Finally, the section will review legal scholars'
predictions as to how the U.S. Supreme Court would assess state provisions that
disenfranchise people with mental impairments.
Intellectual disability has never been considered a suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.2 0 The Supreme Court announced this principle in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, in a case challenging the constitutionality of the City
of Cleburne's zoning policy. The City required Cleburne Living Center to obtain
a special-use permit to operate a group home for people with intellectual
disabilities in a residential neighborhood. Although the Court unanimously found
an Equal Protection violation based on the particular facts under review,2 a
majority of the justices followed a rational-basis standard.22 In Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence, legislative enactments and executive actions that classify
among persons are subject to different levels of constitutional scrutiny depending
on the nature of the classification. Classifications not deemed "suspect" are
reviewed under the rational-basis standard-the lowest applicable standard-and
are upheld as long as some set of facts exists which would provide a rational
19. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Capacity to Vote of Persons with Alzheimer's
Disease, 162 AM. J. PSYCIHATRY 2094 (2005); Symposium, Facilitating Voting as People Age:
Implications of Cognitive Impairment, 38 McGEORGE L. REv. 843 (2007); Hoerner, supra note 12,
at 111.
20. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985). The decision uses
the term "mental retardation" to refer to intellectual disability. For the Equal Protection Clause, see
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws.").
21. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-56.
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basis for the government's use of such a classification.2 3
The Court relied on four factors to determine that intellectual disability is not
a suspect classification: (a) intellectual disability is a real, immutable difference,
causing "a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world," and
states therefore have a legitimate interest in legal differentiation;24 (b) evidence
of legislative responses to the difficulties of people with intellectual disabilities
disproves the contention that such people suffer from prejudice and need the
assistance of the judiciary;25 (c) evidence of legislative responses also suggests
that this class has political power and does not require judicial interference to
protect its interests;26 and (d) it is difficult to distinguish this "large and
amorphous class" of people from other disadvantaged groups-"the aging, the
disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm"-and the court did not want to
undertake that complicated inquiry.27 Therefore, legislation may separately
classify people with intellectual disabilities as long as the particular classification
is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." 2 8
Some condemned that the Court's opinion labored to articulate a standard of
review for a law that failed even rational-basis review, the most deferential of
standards. 29 Furthermore, this particular brand of rational-basis review sounded
far less deferential than that employed in other cases and more like "de facto
heightened scrutiny."30 Bornstein argues the Court wanted the law to fall, but
chose its reasoning to account for: (a) widespread opposition of suburban
communities to hosting group homes; (b) the Reagan Administration's scaling
back of governmental accommodation to people with disabilities; and (c) Justice
White's uniquely strong preference for rational-basis review.3 '
Three of the Court's four factors were widely criticized by Justice Marshall
in his concurring opinion and by subsequent critics, for several reasons. First, in
Equal Protection jurisprudence, the supposed immutability of intellectual
23. For a canonical statement of the rational-basis standard, see United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) ("Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation
whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such
facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of a statute
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the
court that those facts have ceased to exist." (internal citations omitted)).
24. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43.
25. Id. at 443-45.
26. Id. at 445.
27. Id. at 445-46.
28. id. at 446.
29. See Laura C. Bornstein, Contextualizing Cleburne, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 91, 99 &
n.66 (2010) (citing several articles that made this observation).
30. John D. Wilson, Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step in Equal Protection Analysis,
46 MD. L. REv. 163, 188-89 (1986); see also Bornstein, supra note 29, at 99 & n.67 (citing several
other articles that made this observation).
31. Bornstein, supra note 29, at 100-15.
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disability would actually favor heightened scrutiny because people "should not
be held responsible for traits over which they have no control," such as race or
sex.32 Moreover, prejudice has historically led legislators to misunderstand the
relevance of immutable differences to the enjoyment of equal protection, as m
the once-prevalent presumption that children with intellectual disabilities could
not benefit from education.3 3 Second, in considering legislative responses, the
Court ignored a long history of exclusionary laws targeted at people with
intellectual disabilities, such as eugenic-sterilization requirements, denial of
education, and disenfranchisement.34 Moreover, the Court's precedents on race
and gender classifications have continued to apply higher levels of scrutiny
despite the enactment of protective legislation for both categories." Finally, the
enactment of protective legislation does not suffice to establish that people with
intellectual disabilities possess real political power.36 For instance, in Frontiero v.
Richardson, a 1973 gender-classification case, the Court found women lacked
political power by noting their inadequate representation among elected
officials. 37 The comparable lack of elected representatives with intellectual
disabilities might therefore indicate that this group also lacks "political power"
for Equal Protection purposes.3 8
Still, despite the lack of suspect-classification status for people with
intellectual disabilities, a route to strict scrutiny remains open for mental-
impairment-based suffrage restrictions because of the special nature of the right
to vote. Even though this right is not explicitly mentioned in the U.S.
Constitution, the Supreme Court recognizes it as "a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society . . . preservative of other basic civil and political
rights[.]"3 9 Thus, any state law abridging the right to vote on the basis of any
32. Wilson, supra note 30, at 176; see also Kay Schriner et al., The Last Suffrage Movement:
Voting Rights for Persons with Cognitive and Emotional Disabilities, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
75, 81 (1997).
33. Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 81; see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462-63 (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("Retarded children were categorically excluded from public schools,
based on the false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported need to protect
nonretarded children from them.").
34. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting); Bornstein, supra
note 29, at 98; Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 82-83; Wilson, supra note 30, at 176-78.
35. Wilson, supra note 30, at 180-82.
36. Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 83 (pointing out that an important driving force behind
such protective legislation is the sympathetic support of mental health professionals and others,
which is not the same as autonomous political decision making on the part of the people with
intellectual disabilities themselves).
37. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
38. Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 30, at 182-83.
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but
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classification-"suspect" or not-is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and may only
be upheld if necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.40
The extent of constitutional protection for this fundamental voting right was
probed in the literacy-test controversies of the South. Following the ratification
of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which prohibited federal and state
governments from disenfranchising on the basis of "race, color, or previous
condition of servitude[,]" 4 1 every southern state enacted putatively colorblind
measures to prevent black people from voting, including English literacy
requirements for voters. 42 In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of North Carolina's English-
literacy test, finding that "[t]he ability to read and write ... has some relation to
standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy
are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show."43
Congress responded to Lassiter in Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which prohibited states from using English-literacy tests to disqualify
voters who had completed sixth grade in U.S.-accredited schools "in which the
predominant classroom language was other than English," such as the schools of
Puerto Rico." In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Supreme Court upheld Congress'
decision to restrict state prerogatives in this way, finding that section 4(e) was "a
proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment[.]" 4 5
This history of the U.S. experience with literacy tests provides helpful
background for recent constitutional challenges to mental-impairment-based
suffrage restrictions. When, in the twenty-first century, U.S. courts came face-to-
nevertheless [voting] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights.").
40. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (finding durational residency requirements invalid
under strict scrutiny, since such requirements were not necessary to promote the state's interest in
preventing fraudulent voting and ensuring a knowledgeable electorate).
41. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
42. ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 652 (4th ed. 2014).
43. Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
44. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended at
52 U.S.C. § 10303(e) (2008)).
45. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,"
including the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. The Court explained that
under the Supremacy Clause, section 4(e) preempted New York's English-literacy law, and
therefore made it unenforceable. Thus, even though the New York literacy requirement at issue was
not itself found unconstitutional, "it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might
predicate a judgment that [the law's application to the Puerto Rican community] constituted an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 656.
The Voting Rights Act's literacy-test provision was deemed an appropriate legislative action to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 658.
217
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face with another breed of state laws premised upon preventing people from
voting for reasons of intelligence, they were naturally skeptical. Whether or not
states have a compelling interest in an intelligent electorate,46 laws designed to
protect that interest are likely to be driven by prejudice and are susceptible to
discriminatory application against disfavored groups.4 7 Two federal court
decisions address this concern.
First, in Doe v. Rowe,4 8 Maine's district court became the first to directly
address mental-impairment-based state suffrage restrictions. Three women and
an advocacy organization challenged a provision in Maine's constitution that
withheld suffrage from the individual plaintiffs and all others "under
guardianship for reasons of mental illness."4 9 Both the plaintiffs and the State
Attorney General agreed on strict scrutiny as the appropriate test, and both
agreed that Maine had a compelling interest in ensuring that voters have capacity
"to understand the nature and effect of the voting act" (seemingly echoing the
statutory language of the State of Washington)."o The court struck down this
provision on its face as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Since the
disenfranchisement reached only people with mental illness and not those with
other forms of mental incapacity, such as intellectual disability, the provision was
not tailored to meet the State's asserted interest.'
The court also struck down the provision on two other grounds. First, it
found the provision facially unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause because individuals subject to guardianship proceedings for
mental illness were not provided "uniformly adequate notice regarding the
potential disenfranchising effect" of a guardianship placement." Second, the
46. See infra page 275 (explaining the theory that states' interest in an intelligent electorate
justifies the exclusion of certain unintelligent voters).
47. See Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 87-92. The subject of rationales for
disenfranchisement will be taken up in greater detail below. See infra Part I.C.
48. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001).
49. ME. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1965).
50. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d, at 51. For the Washington statute, see WASH. REV. CODE §
11.88.010(5) ("Imposition of a guardianship for an incapacitated person shall not result in the loss
of the right to vote unless the court determines that the person is incompetent for purposes of
rationally exercising the franchise in that the individual lacks the capacity to understand the nature
and effect of voting such that she or he cannot make an individual choice.").
51. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56. In defense of the provision, Maine's Attorney General
advanced a constitutional construction, broadly reading "mental illness" to include other forms of
incapacity, but the court rejected that construction as archaic and regressive, resulting in the
disenfranchisement of a great number of people who are sufficiently competent to vote. Id at 53-
56; see also In re The Guardianship of Erickson, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 193 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct.
4, 2012) (relying on Rowe's constitutional holdings, the state court invalidated a provision of the
Minnesota Constitution that states: "the following persons shall not be entitled or permitted to vote
at any election in this state . . . a person under guardianship, or a person who is insane or not
mentally competent," MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
52. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d, at 50-51. Here, too, the State attempted to save the provision by
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provision violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 5 3 because plaintiffs were qualified
individuals with disabilities who were discriminated against by a public entity by
reason of their disabilities.54
Six years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
considered a challenge to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution,
which provides that "no person who has a guardian of his or her estate or person
by reason of mental incapacity . . . shall be entitled to vote." This claim, too, was
brought against the State by three individuals under guardianship and an
advocacy group. The court rejected a facial Equal Protection challenge, finding
that Missouri probate courts' power to preserve a ward's right to vote avoids
imposition of a categorical ban on all people under guardianship. 56 Instead, the
court found the Missouri provision did no more than impose a case-specific
capacity standard. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs
ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim, also for lack of proof of categorical restriction.5 1
Though the jurisdiction of these two courts reaches just a small percentage
of the U.S. populace, Rowe and Carnahan provide tools for other courts to
overturn categorical suffrage bans, while upholding those bans subject to a
particularized process of finding incapacity to vote.58
Some scholars have attempted to forecast how the Supreme Court might rule
on this issue by reference to a conceptual analysis of its prior election-law
jurisprudence.5 9 Adam Winkler has discerned in this jurisprudence an adoption of
what he calls the "instrumental power" view, according to which voting is a
"societal tool for exerting political power .. protected only to the extent that it
retains a right to suffrage unless this right is specifically challenged by a petitioner and considered
by a probate judge in the course of guardianship proceedings. The court agreed that such a
construction would satisfy procedural due process, but found that it had not been properly adopted
as law. Rather, the attorney general's construction constituted an invalid "amendment to substantive
state law" and failed to save the constitutional provision. Id. at 49-50.
53. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. II, 104 Stat. 337 (1990) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355,
394 (2012) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)).
54. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d, at 57-59. The state contested this finding by referring to its
narrowing construction explained supra note 52. The court declined to consider the new
construction in this context, clarifying that "there is no such thing as a facial challenge to the
State's compliance with a federal statute." Id. at 59. Rather, the statutory claim concerns only
previous and ongoing conduct. For more on the lasting impact of the Rowe decision, see the
discussion of capacity-based suffrage restriction infra Part II.A.
55. Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007).
56. Id at 808-09.
57. Id. at 812.
58. See Hoerner, supra note 12, at 113-14 (identifying the categorical/particularized finding
test as the only useful conclusion of Rowe and Carnahan).
59. Jennifer A. Bindel, Note, Equal Protection Jurisprudeni&e and the Voting Rights of Persons
with Diminished Mental Capacities, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 87, 111-14 (2009).
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can be used as a means of pursuing informed political choices.""o This view
seems to justify suffrage restrictions targeting those less capable of independent,
informed choice, seeing such restrictions as a less-than-"severe" burden:
"Disenfranchisement will be allowed for those in the electorate insufficiently
intelligent . "61 Correspondingly, the Supreme Court has shied away from
conceiving of voting as an "expressive" act,62 in which it "is considered a means
of communicating various political ends and desires."63 However, if a future
Supreme Court is willing to reconceive of the franchise as an individual right to
participate expressively in a public ritual of civil society, that Court would be
more likely to treat mental-impairment-based restrictions as a "severe" burden
worthy of strict scrutiny. 64
B. International Human Rights Law
As noted above, democracies across the world disenfranchise people on the
basis of mental impairments. This phenomenon has received attention in the
corpus of international human rights law. Generally speaking, just as the electoral
regulations of individual U.S. states must comply with the U.S. Constitution and
federal statutes, the electoral regulations of independent nations must comply
with applicable international law. The following section will (a) address the
United Nations' conventional response to the problem of voters with mental
impairments; (b) review the relevant case law of judicial and quasi-judicial
international tribunals; and (c) summarize a recent proposal for a new legal test
for assessing the validity, under international human rights law, of various
nations' disenfranchising provisions.
Article 29(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD) requires states parties to "[e]nsure that persons with
disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an
equal basis with others . . . including the right and opportunity for persons with
disabilities to vote and be elected."65 The Convention has 172 parties, and 15
additional states (including the United States) have signed the Convention but not
yet ratified it.66 Additionally, the Optional Protocol, allowing individual recourse
60. Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 330-31 (1993).
61. Id. at 343.
62. Id. at 338 (noting "the failure of the Court's guiding conception of the right to vote to
capture certain expressive values inherent in voting.").
63. Id. at 365.
64. See Bindel, supra note 59, at 114-21 (advocating strict-scrutiny review of mental-
impairment-based suffrage restrictions on the basis of an expressive view of voting, in reliance
upon the ideas of Winkler and other theorists).
65. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 29(a), Mar. 30, 2007, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3.
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to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee)
for allegations of Convention violations,6 7 has ninety-two parties."8 France, 6 9
Malta,70 Romania," and Singapore72 entered Reservations and Declarations
regarding the applicability of Article 29 to existing electoral regulations and to
potential safeguards against manipulation of voters with mental impairments.
However, the vast majority of states parties remain fully bound to the
requirements of Article 29, and its plain meaning prohibits any law
disenfranchising people on the basis of any disability.73
Article 29(a) has become the subject of international litigation in recent
years. In Kiss v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
considered the claim of a Hungarian national against his government after his
diagnosis of manic depression and guardianship placement resulted in automatic
loss of his right to vote.74 Relying on both the European Convention on Human
Rights' general guarantee of the right to vote and Article 29 of the CRPD, the
15.en.pdf[https://perma.cc/WSR2-N2PR].
67. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 1.1,
Mar. 30, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 ("A State Party to the present Protocol ("State Party")
recognizes the competence of the Committee . . . to receive and consider communications from or
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims
of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the convention."); id. at art. 6 ("If the
Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations . . . the
Committee shall invite that State Party to cooperate in the examination of the information and to
this end submit observations. . . . The State Party concerned shall, within six months of receiving
the findings, comments, and recommendations transmitted by the Committee, submit its
observations to the Committee.").
68. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED
NATIONs TREATY COLLECTION 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%
201
/Chapter%20IV/IV-15-a.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q7Y-ARUD] (showing that the United States is
not a party to the Optional Protocol).
69. Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, supra note 66, at 7.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id. at 14.
72. Id. at 9.
73. See, e.g., Redley et al., supra note 18, at 1027 ("States with laws declaring people legally
incapacitated because of a disability . .. violate Article 29"); see also Eur. Comm'n for Democracy
Through Law (Venice Comm'n), Revised Interpretive Declaration to the Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters on the Participation of People with Disabilities in Elections, COUNSEL OF EUR.
CDL-AD (2011)045 ("People with disabilities may not be discriminated against in [suffrage
matters], in conformity with Article 29 of the Convention of the United Nations on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities . . . ."). Some authors have undertaken to assess individual states'
compliance with established CRPD law in this matter. See, e.g., Redley et al., supra note 18
(examining the situation in Kenya, England, and Wales); Jonathon Savery, Comment, Voting Rights
and Intellectual Disability in Australia: An Illegal and Unjustified Denial ofRights, 37 SYDNEY L.
REV. 287 (2015) (examining the situation in Australia).
74. Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 22 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-98800"]} [https://perma.cc/A2FP-JBFV].
75. The ECtHR routinely refers to the CRPD in informing its own standards under the
European Convention. See Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 83 & n.69.
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Court rejected Hungary's practice of automatic disenfranchisement but explicitly
allowed for disenfranchisement based upon individualized consideration of voter
capacity.76
In line with this decision and with a pre-CRPD Human Rights Committee
General Comment,n the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), a constitutional law advisory body of the Council of
Europe, released an Interpretive Declaration allowing disenfranchisement on the
basis of "individual decision of a court of law [finding] proven mental
disability."7 After a firestorm of criticism and a worldwide NGO campaign led
by the UK-based Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, the Venice Commission
reversed course, announcing that "universal suffrage is a fundamental principle
of the European Electoral Heritage. People with disabilities may not be
discriminated against in this regard, in conformity with Article 29 of the
Convention of the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities[.]""
Subsequently, the Human Rights Commissioner for the Council of Europe, the
U.N. Human Rights Council, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee have all
affirmed this absolutist interpretation of Article 29."1
In 2013, the CRPD Committee considered an Optional Protocol complaint
against Hungary in which, again, six individuals were automatically barred from
voting as a consequence of being placed under guardianship.82 In its defense,
Hungary noted that it had amended its electoral legislation to bring it into
compliance with the Kiss ruling,83 but the Committee nevertheless found
Hungary in violation of Article 29 and declared an obligation for Hungary to
remedy the individuals' injury and take preventative steps against future
76. Alajos Kiss, App. No. 38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 42. In Gajesi v Hungary, the ECtIIR
considered a set of facts "virtually identical to those of the Alajos Kiss judgment" and reached the
same result. Gajcsi v. Hungary, App. No. 62924/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 11 (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-146411"]) [https://perma.cc/26J3-7N6H].
77. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 25, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996) ("[E]stablished mental incapacity may be a ground for
denying a person the right to vote or to hold office.").
78. Venice Comm'n, Interpretive Declaration the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
on the Participation of People with Disabilities in Elections, COUNSEL OF EUR. CDL-AD
(2010)036.
79. See Oliver Lewis, Two Years and Seven Minutes Ago, MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOC. CTR.:
OLIVER TALKS (June 18, 2013), http://www.mdac.info/en/olivertalks/2013/06/18/two-years-and-
seven-minutes-ago [https://perma.cc/XY2W-PYWB]; see also Redley et al., supra note 18, at
1029-30.
80. Eur. Comm'n for Democracy through Law (Venice Comm'n), supra note 73, § II, ¶ 2.
81. For a more detailed account of these developments, see Redley et al., supra note 18, at
1030.
82. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Views of the Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities Under Article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Tenth Session), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 (Oct. 16,
2013).
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violations.8 4 In response to Hungary's defense, the Committee noted: (a)
legislative change notwithstanding, the six individuals had, in actuality, been
automatically barred from voting; and (b) even the new legislation violated
Article 29, as it provided for disenfranchisement on the basis of individualized
determination of incapacity, while Article 29 bars all disability-based
disenfranchisement." The CRPD Committee thus rejected the ECtHR's
interpretation of Article 29 in Kiss. The Committee has reinforced its absolutist
interpretation of Article 29 in several "Concluding Observations" on reports of
its states parties, urging elimination of all mental-impairment-based suffrage
restrictions.86
In 2014, three Harvard Law School researchers published an international
human rights law analysis of disabilities-related suffrage restrictions. 7 After
recounting the judicial and quasi-judicial developments described above, the
authors proposed an test to determine when states may, consistent with
international law, restrict the exercise of human rights: "[f]ach abridgement must
be prescribed by law and objectively justified on one or more specified grounds.
Thus, the restriction must pursue an acceptable aim and must be necessary to
achieve that objective without unduly restricting the right in question.""
Disenfranchisement of people with disabilities, the authors argue, satisfies
neither of these prongs.
First, the aim of protecting the integrity of the electorate from incompetent
voters, although approved by Kiss,89 is rendered illegitimate by the overarching
purpose of the CRPD, which is to affirm the autonomy and equal legal capacity
of persons with disabilities.90 Second, even accepting Kiss's conclusion that
84. Id. T 10.
85. Id. ¶ 9.3.
86. For a partial listing and overview of these Concluding Observations, see Savery, supra note
73, at 292-94 & n.43.
87. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18.
88. Id. at 90. As precedent for this test, the authors refer to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
and the European Convention on Human Rights. See id. & nn. 109-10. This test's "acceptable aim"
sounds similar to the U.S. strict-scrutiny test's "compelling interest," and "necessary to achieve that
objective without unduly restricting the right in question" sounds like strict scrutiny's "narrowly
tailored to achieve" the interest. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing the
strict-scrutiny test).
89. Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-98800"]} [https://perma.cc/A2FP-JBFV].
90. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 91 ("[This] is exactly what the CRPD aims to
overcome, and therefore it is decidedly unclear whether the ECtHR's justification would prevail
under an analysis grounded in the CRPD"). For additional substantiation of this claim regarding the
purpose of the CRPD, see, for example, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 65, at pmbl.(e) ("Recognizing the importance for persons with disabilities of their
individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their own choices . . . .");
id. at art. 12.2 ("States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on
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protecting the integrity of the electorate is a legitimate aim, measures pursuing
this aim must not unduly restrict individual suffrage rights." For this second
prong, the authors employ ECtHR's "proportionality" analysis as follows: 9 2 The
number of individuals who are incapable of voting, or of doing so in a rational
manner, is miniscule compared to the number of capable voters who cast votes in
error or based on irrational considerations. "Thus, any gains to the legitimacy of
a state's electoral system associated with disability-based restrictions . . . are
marginal at best."93
States may respond that, though they cannot identify all irrational voters,
they can identify those incapable of voting rationally.94 Still, any system for
assessing capacity, even if not based on a categorical exclusion, will inevitably
impact some capable voters because no system is perfectly accurate.9 5 Some
overexclusion is permissible under international law, as in age and residency
requirements for voting.9 6 However, while age and residency are not "suspect
classifications" under international law, disability is, and therefore is precluded
as a basis for discrimination under both the CRPD and the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR.9 7 In addition, allowing individualized capacity assessments would be an
ill-advised stance for international human rights law, because "international
bodies are simply not in a good position to police assessment procedures." 98
Clear rules are preferable, and because a categorical disenfranchisement of all
mentally impaired people is clearly prohibited under international law,
eliminating all disability-related disenfranchisement is the only reasonable
an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.").
91. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the "unduly restricts" test).
92. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 92 n.118. The authors do not elaborate on the
principles of this ECtHR doctrine, but refer in a footnote to Aharon Barak, Proportionality and
Principled Balancing, 4 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTs. 3, 6 (2010).
93. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 92-93 (using Hungary as an example, the authors
present statistics placing the population of incapable voters at less than 0.15 percent of the
electorate, and the population of capable voters who, in practice, vote in error or irrationally, at
more than 3 percent).
94. Id. at 93-94.
95. Id at 94. For this point, the authors cite Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum,
Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters,
38 McGEORGE L. REV. 931, 962 (2007) ("There is no scientifically determinable point on that
spectrum at which we can say the person manifests sufficient capacity for the task.").
96. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 94. These requirements, too, attempt to address voting
capacity but do so by excluding a broad sector of the population.
97. Id. For their claim that age and residency are not "suspect classifications," the authors note
the absence of these categories from the list of prohibited bases of discrimination in ECHR art. 14.
The term "suspect classification" appears to be borrowed from U.S. jurisprudence, although the
authors do not make this association explicit. As noted above, mental disability is not currently
considered a suspect classification in U.S. constitutional law. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text. For anti-disability discrimination's preclusion under the CRPD and ECtHR jurisprudence, see
supra Part I.B.
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option.99
Finally, the Harvard researchers' proportionality analysis requires states to
consider "a less restrictive alternative.""' Education and facilitation can
effectively lower the rate of participation of voters incapable of voting rationally
by helping more voters make rational decisions. Therefore, European states must
undertake inclusive measures rather than resort to exclusion.' 0
C. Democratic Theory: Normative Rationales and Criticisms
In addition to the different streams of legal analysis addressed above, the
political-science literature on the subject of mental-impairment-based suffrage
restrictions features a lively normative debate. This literature advances, and
disputes, several rationales for disenfranchising people on the basis of mental
impairments. The rationales can be helpfully grouped into two categories: (1)
enfranchising people with mental impairments is inherently problematic; and (2)
voters with mental impairments can be easily manipulated to vote in a manner
that endangers the electoral process. The following section will review each of
these rationales and the various criticisms lodged against them by political
scientists and philosophers.
1. Argument That Enfranchising Mentally Impaired Individuals Is Inherently
Problematic
One popular position, elaborated in the following paragraphs, argues that
membership in democratic society, or the demos, depends upon the capacity to
make rational judgments. According to this view, the idea of democracy rejects
the legitimacy of autocratic or oligarchic political power, in which all members
of society are subject to the judgment of only a small number of them. Voting in
a democratic system, by contrast, allows all members of the demos to collectively
exercise power through their own independent judgment. To the extent that
certain classes of individuals are incapable of independent judgment, then, any
power they exercise is democratically illegitimate. Therefore, such people,
though they are subject to the will of the demos, cannot themselves be included
within it.
John Stuart Mill expressed this idea in 1861: "No one but those in whom an
ai priori theory has silenced common sense, will maintain, that power over others,
over the whole community, should be imparted to people who have not acquired
the commonest and most essential requisites . . . for pursuing intelligently their
99. Id. at 96.
100. Id. at 96 & n.145; see also Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 33
(2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng# {"itemid": ["001-98800"] } [https://perma.cc/A2FP-JBFV].
101. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 96.
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own interests."l0 2 And Robert A. Dahl, a political scientist and theorist of
political pluralism, wrote in 1989:
That we cannot get around the principle of competence in deciding on
the inclusiveness of the demos is decisively demonstrated by the
exclusion of children . . . .103 There are also the troublesome cases for
which experience, even when joined withcompassion, points to no clear
solution. . . . The demos must include all adult members of the
association except transients and persons proved to be mentally
defective.' '
Upon this theoretical basis, states may choose to utilize the electoral law to
protect the legitimacy of the democratic process.'s And states have indeed
invoked this rationale in legal contexts. When challenged in court, Maine and
Hungary referred to this argument, and neither court rejected it."' In another
telling judicial pronouncement, a Minnesota state judge framed participation of
incompetent voters as an actual injury suffered by the rest of the population,
102. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATRIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861), reprinted
in 19 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JoHN STUART MILL 371, 470 (John M. Robson ed., 1976).
103. For more on the question of enfranchising minors, see CLAUDIO LOPEZ-GUERRA,
DEMOCRACY AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT: THE MORALITY OF ELECTORAL ExCLusioNs 61 (2014);
Linda Barclay, Cognitive Impairment and the Right to Vote: A Strategic Approach, 30 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 146 (2013); Joanne C. Lau, Two Arguments for Child Enfranchisement, 60 POL. STUD. 860
(2012); Nicholas John Munn, Capacity Testing the Youth: A Proposal for Broader Enfranchisement,
15 J. YOUTH STUD. 1048 (2012). The problem of suffrage for minors is certainly related to the
problem of suffrage for people with mental impairments, but, because this Note leaves the issue of
minors aside for another day.
104. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 126-29 (1989). For a more recent
articulation of the illegitimacy of a democratic process that enfranchises people with mental
impairments, see Karlan, supra note 16, at 918 ("And yet, there's something discomfiting about the
idea that voters may be casting their ballots randomly or arbitrarily, without real comprehension of
the issues or of the candidates' positions. The idea that voting reflects the citizenry's free and
informed choices is central to the legitimacy of our political system.").
105. For more on the role of this rationale in the development of electoral law vis-a-vis people
with mental impairments, see, for example, Hurme.& Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 964.
106. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 (D. Me. 2001) ("[T]he parties agree that Maine
has a compelling state interest in ensuring that 'those who cast a vote have the mental capacity to
make their own decision by being able to understand the nature and effect of the voting act itself.'
The only question left for the Court to resolve is whether Maine's restriction is narrowly tailored to
meet this compelling interest.") (internal citation omitted); Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No.
38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-98800"]}
[https://perma.cc/A2FP-JBFV] ("[Hungary] submitted that the measure complained of pursued the
legitimate aim of ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing the consequences of their
decisions and making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs. The
applicant accepted this view and the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise."). The Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, however, rejected Hungary's defense as per se illegitimate
because it is prohibited by international law. See Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
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declaring that voter-capacity assessment was the court "owes [to] the general
electorate."' 0 7
Others frame this problem differently, and with decidedly lower stakes:
Even if the participation of people with mental impairments does not undermine
the legitimacy of the democratic process, society has a reasonable utilitarian
interest in an intelligent electorate. To avoid "sub-optimal political outcomes,"
the majority of voters choose to enact constitutions or legislation excluding the
minority whose judgment is devoid of rationality and untrained by a
sophisticated education.' In the terminology of classical republicanism, ideal
results follow when the "civic duty" of voting is preconditioned upon the "civic
virtue of . . . capacity for critical understanding and rational choice."l 09
Moreover, when people lacking civic virtue cast votes, they may negate the
effect, vote-by-vote, of votes cast by individuals possessing civic virtue.'
Yet another formulation focuses on the "social contract" aspect of
democracy. Individuals enter into the social contract by voting, an act that
expresses their consent to be governed by people chosen through the electoral
system. Because the chosen leaders have power to regulate and tax private
property, an individual's consent to the social contract brings direct financial
consequences. Thus, the social contract created by voting is also a commercial
contract. Just as mental capacity is a fundamental element of any commercial
contract-due to "the public policy of protecting an incapacitated person from
assuming contractual duties to which she was not capable of assenting"-so must
it be for the contract of voting. "
Recent scholarship has challenged the "inherent problem" rationales on
several grounds. First, some note that there is simply insufficient evidence to
show that enfranchising people with mental impairments hurts the quality of
elections." 2 In fact, the available evidence cuts against this claim from two
directions. As far as mental illness is concerned, multiple studies have shown that
the voting behavior of psychiatric inpatients closely mirrors the votes of the
107. In re Guardianship of Erickson, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 193, *30 n.5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct.
4, 2012).
108. Redley et al., supra note 18, at 1027; see also Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 87-92
(analyzing the "intelligent electorate" rationale's potential as a "compelling" state interest); Bindel,
supra note 59, at 121 (conducting the same analysis).
109. James. T. McHugh, Idiots and Insane Persons: Electoral Exclusion and Democratic Values
Within the Ohio Constitution, 76 ALB. L. REv. 2189,2209 (2012).
110. Id.
111. Id at 2214-15 (construing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 3-7 (4th ed. 2004)). For a
historical presentation of this rationale, see Kay Schriner, The Competence Line in American
Suffrage Law: A Political Analysis, 22 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 61, *8 (2002), http://dsq-
sds.org/article/view/345/438 [https://perma.cc/U3N2-YARU] ("Just as they could not enter into
civil contracts neither could they take part in the political contract.").
112. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, "I Vote. I Count": Mental Disability and the Right to Vote,
51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 849, 850 (2000); L6PEZ-GUERRA, supra note 103, at 64-65.
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patients' communities and socioeconomic strata."' At the same time, evidence
shows that a significant percentage of presumptively rational voters make
electoral decisions based on emotional, irrational factors and have little
familiarity with the substantive policy issues at stake.114 Political scientist
Claudio L6pez-Guerra has reasoned that defenders of disenfranchisement have to
show that their logic "is so decisive-the risk [of people with mental
impairments hurting the quality of electoral outcomes] would be too great-that
it would be wrong to even give them a try. For indeed, the enfranchisement ...
can be undone if the results prove to be undesirable . . . [but they] cannot be
shown to be so undesirable ex ante.""'
Another version of the "inherent problem" rationale focuses on public
perception. "Were the voting public to perceive that incompetent persons
routinely cast ballots, the seriousness with which competent voters approach the
process of selecting candidates and issues for their support might be
diminished.""'6 But, again, this fear is not substantiated by published evidence,
and is in fact undermined-if not necessarily refuted-by the evidence that,
despite the existing disenfranchisement of presumptively incompetent voters,
presumptively competent voters often fail to approach the process with sufficient
seriousness. Additionally, Linda Barclay has convincingly argued that this
perception concern simply reflects society's discriminatory attitudes and should
therefore not be entertained. "If we see the value of the vote being trashed only in
the case where people with cognitive impairments are voting [despite a lack of
evidence to that effect], then I would suggest that we should admit our prejudices
and focus our energies on tackling those.""'
Second, some argue that rational capacity is morally unrelated to the
fundamental right to vote. Robert Goodin and others have proposed an "affected
interests" model for suffrage, arguing that all individuals whose interests are at
stake in a democratic polity's governmental decisions must be considered
members of the demos entrusted with choosing the polity's leaders." This
113. See, e.g., George Howard & Robert Anthony, The Right to Vote and Voting Patterns of
Hospitalized Psychiatric Patients, 49 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 124 (1977); Morris M. Klein & Saul A.
Grossman, Voting Competence and Mental Illness, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1562 (1971); Alfred N.
Wellner & Lawrence S. Gaines, Patients'Right to Vote, 21 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 163
(1970).
114. See, e.g., Redley et al., supra note 18, at 1027-28; Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 89 &
n.65; Bindel, supra note 59, at 115-16 & nn.169-73; see also supra notes 94-101 and
accompanying text (applying this argument in a "proportionality" analysis to demonstrate the
illegality of mental impairment-based suffrage restrictions under international human rights law).
115. L6PEZ-GUERRA, supra note 103, at 65.
116. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 964; see also Barclay, supra note 103, at 157 ("[I]t
might be argued that symbolic damage is done to value of voting and of democracy itself if we
allow people without capacity to vote ....
117. Barclay, supra note 103, at 157.
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principle necessarily includes people with mental impairments. Whether or not
they can express their interests rationally, and whether or not expression of their
interests will hurt the quality of elections, "[i]t is not as if those interests are less
deserving of consideration."l 9, 
12 0
Goodin's argument explicitly includes enfranchisement for non-human
animals whose interests are affected by government,121 and Linda Barclay sees
this point as a fatal flaw of Goodin's proposition. The comparison to animals is
deeply insulting to people with disabilities, and is opposed by disability-rights
advocates who see such an alignment as hurting the political viability of their
cause. 122
Third, focusing on the utility, or legitimacy, of participation of people with
mental impairments in government ignores another important facet of suffrage.
Voting is not only about electing leaders; voting is also a politically expressive
act, a means of connecting the voter to the community, and an essential public
ritual of democracy.1 23 Mental health professionals, as well, have emphasized the
therapeutic potential of voting as a form of social inclusion for people with
various forms of mental impairment.1 24
Another important criticism of the "inherent problem" rationales focuses on
the disconnect between the objectives of disenfranchisement and the actual legal
provisions.12 Many of the cognitive and mental statuses targeted by
disenfranchising provisions around the world and in the United States are
PUB. AFF. 40 (2007); see also Barclay, supra note 103, at 148 & n.11.
119. Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising the Earth, and its Alternatives, 44 POL. STUD. 835, 841
(1996).
120. L6PEz-GUERRA, supra note 103, at 71-72 & n.25. This argument differs from the
democratic legitimacy argument advanced by Mill and Dahl, supra notes 102 & 104 and
accompanying text, in that it focuses upon the importance of rational thought for a person's ability
to protect her own affected interests, rather than on the importance of rational thought for a
person's right to exercise political power over other members of society.
121. Goodin's argument also necessarily includes enfranchisement for children and non-
citizens. These subjects are beyond the scope of this article. For more on the question of
enfranchising children, see supra note 103. For more on the question of non-citizen suffrage, see
Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391 (1993).
122. Barclay, supra note 103, at 150.
123. Winkler, supra note 60 (noting that, as a matter of U.S. law, the Supreme Court has not
endorsed the expressive view of the franchise); see also, Bindel, supra note 59, at 111-20
(explicitly applying Winkler's "expressive" voting theory to the mental impairment-based suffrage
restriction context).
124. Michael Nash, Voting as a Means of Social Inclusion for People with a Mental Illness, 9 J.
PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 697 (2002); see also Bindel, supra note 59, at 120 &
nn.193-94.
125. See, e.g., Beckman, supra note 1, at 221 ("A basic problem with legal rules excluding
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extremely vague and archaic. 126 Disenfranchisement of "idiots" or people with
"unsound mind", or even of more contemporary statuses such as guardianship
and intellectual disability, inevitably reaches large numbers of people who are
fully capable of rational decision-making.1 2 7
Furthermore, the broader the classification targeted, the more likely it is that
suffrage restrictions will be enforced arbitrarily against disfavored populations,
as were the U.S. literacy tests addressed supra Part I.A.12 8 Mental-status-based
restrictions not only originate from stigmatization of people with mental
impairments, but they help perpetuate such prejudiced and unscientific attitudes
by enshrining these attitudes in the law.1 29 As a result, scholars and courts have
started to advocate shifting the focus of disenfranchising provisions from status
to some more objective measure of voting capacity. This development, and the
debate surrounding it, will be taken up in greater detail below.130
2. Manipulation of Voters with Mental Impairments
Many scholars have addressed the concern that people with mental
impairments are especially susceptible to the influence and manipulation of their
guardians, caregivers, and family members. Enfranchisement of people with
mental impairment thus allows other people in their lives to quietly appropriate
extra votes and obtain outsized political influence for themselves.' 3 '
Ludvig Beckman contends that this fear of vote misappropriation stems from
the canon of democratic theory. 3 2 As explained above,'33 Mill, Dahl, and other
political theorists saw capacity for independent, rational decision-making as the
basis of democratic legitimacy. In Beckman's elaboration, independence is
126. For provisions around the world, see Bhugra et al., supra note 3, at 396 ("Varying and
stigmatizing terminology is used in legislation to describe persons with mental health problems,
e.g. insanity, weakness of mind, unsound mind, lunatic . . . ."). For provisions in the United States,
see BAZELON CTR., supra note 8, at 13 ("Seven states have laws that use outmoded and
stigmatizing terms such as 'idiots,' 'insane persons,' and 'of unsound mind' to describe who is
barred from voting based on competence concerns. Such laws are rarely enforced because they are
virtually impossible to understand and apply." (internal footnote omitted)).
127. See Appelbaum, supra note 112, at 849-50; Beckman, supra note 1, at 221; Hurme &
Appelbaum, supra note 95; Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 93.
128. Appelbaum, supra note 112, at 849-50; Beckman, supra note 1, at 222.
129. Schriner et al., supra note 32, at 85-86, 95 ("Much progress has been made in recent
decades in demythologizing mental illness and mental retardation, in recognizing and
accommodating the rights of persons with disabilities, and in providing support and assistance to
such persons as necessary. Abolishing legal barriers to voting by such persons would be a logical
and appropriate extension of necessary rights protections, and an extension consistent with modern
efforts to bring persons with disabilities into the mainstream of society.").
130. See infra Part II.
131. See, e.g., Karlawish et al., supra note 13; McHugh, supra note 109, at 2194; Schriner et al.,
supra note 32, at 92; Hoerner, supra note 12, at 122.
132. Beckman, supra note 13, at 15-18.
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essential because it ensures an equal distribution of political influence among the
electorate. The extent to which individual voters possess an outsized influence
undermines the legitimacy of the electoral outcome. It is easy to see, then, how
people whose opinion formation is more dependent on others pose a serious
threat to democracy. Even in the absence of outright voter fraud, people with
mental impairments often live with and depend heavily upon caregivers, and
these circumstances may easily lead them to substitute the caregiver's interests
and political preferences for their own. The result is that certain individuals
receive extra political influence, undermining the equal distribution of power
essential to democratic legitimacy.' 34 Upon this theoretical basis, states may
choose to utilize the electoral law to "protect the integrity of the electoral
process" by excluding those whose suffrage rights endanger the democratic
endeavor.135
However, recent scholarship has questioned this rationale as well. First,
Beckman argued that the traditional bases of democratic theory itself undermined
the "integrity" claim.136 Building on the works of earlier thinkers, he argued that
one of the primary responsibilities of democratic society is to promote the "fair
value of the political rights of its members." 37 To the extent that some members
face obstacles in exercising their basic rights, democratic government must seek
to provide them the means necessary to do so. If someone's "difficulties in
making independent political judgments . . . [are] to be accounted for by
reference to the absence of some opportunity that others should reasonably
provide," society is called upon to provide those opportunities. 138 In other words,
rather than disenfranchising people with mental impairments, the state should
make an effort to socially include them and foster independent judgment, as well
as to educate caregivers on the importance of cultivating their wards'
independent judgment.139
Others have pointed out that the concern for the integrity of the vote, like the
concern over the quality of electoral outcomes, is not borne out by any empirical
evidence of manipulation.' 40 Moreover, the problem of integrity, also like the
outcome quality problem, is not actually particular to people with mental
impairments. "[I]nfluencing a voter's intentions . . . is part of the culture of
134. Beckman, supra note 13, at 16.
135. For more on the role of this rationale in the development of electoral law vis-A-vis people
with mental impairments, see, for example, Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 964; Hoerner,
supra note 12, at 108-19.
136. Beckman, supra note 13, at 18-20.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id. at 19-20. In arguing for accommodation over disenfranchisement, Beckman borrows
explicitly from "the language of American law," requiring a solution "necessary to further the
interest in preventing manipulation." Id. at 19.
140. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 86-89; Redley et al., supra note 18, at 1028.
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politics, and is not something that can easily, or even should be, legislated
against."l41 Citizens regularly seek to persuade each other regarding electoral
politics through op-eds, social media, and ordinary conversation. No one would
contend that these practices undermine the integrity of elections by providing
outsized political power to the persuading party. Far from hindering the exercise
of independent judgment, persuasion actually facilitates the development of such
judgment. The difference between this sort of influence and a guardian's
influence over her ward is one of degree, not kind. 142
II. CAPACITY-BASED RESTRICTIONS VERSES STATUS-BASED RESTRICTIONS
One way to cure the vagueness and discriminatory potential of status-based
suffrage restrictions is to legislate a functional standard. Under such a standard,
disenfranchisement is triggered not by belonging to a certain category of
individuals, but by failing to meet an objective test of capacity. People who
successfully demonstrate capacity are presumptively competent to vote, while
those who do not may be excluded for all the reasons that democratic societies
wish to exclude incompetent people from the franchise.143
The various proposed capacity-assessment models have sought to balance a
state's interests in the quality and integrity of its electorate with each individual's
right to participate in the democratic process. 14 4 Moreover, these models strive to
render an objective measure of capacity to understand the voting process, unlike
assessments of literacy or education level, which inherently favor privileged
classes and have historically been utilized to target poor people and disfavored
racial groups. 145
The following part will address the issue of capacity assessment. Part II.A
141. Redley et al., supra note 18, at 1028.
142. See also Nicholas John Munn, Against the Political Exclusion of the Incapable, 33 J.
APPLIED PHIL. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9) (on file with the author) ("We neither ask nor
care whether someone is voting through well considered deliberation, or as their religious
leadership tells them to, as their political ideology requires, or simply as someone they admire has
claimed to be voting. Discriminating against the incapable for doing what the devout, the
ideologically compelled, and the unconfident do freely would not be defensible.").
143. See supra Part I.C.
144. Hoerner, supra note 12, at 125.
145. See Barclay, supra note 103, at 152 ("[S]urely one reason why education or literacy
requirements for the right to vote are no longer countenanced is because historically they were
often a thinly veiled excuse for racial discrimination or discrimination against the poor. For that
reason educational levels and literacy levels are no longer considered relevant for possessing the
capacity to vote. . . . Perhaps cognizant of the threat of discrimination, the few concrete proposals
for capacity testing people with cognitive impairments that have been proposed do not set the bar
high.. .. This kind of capacity testing is not designed to test whether a person casts her vote in a
'rational' or 'informed' manner (whatever is meant by those terms), but merely whether she
understands the nature and purpose of voting."). For an explanation of the historical significance of
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reviews the existing capacity assessment model proposals, and Part II.B will
argue that the failure of these proposals to become law stems from pragmatic
political considerations.
A. Proposed Assesment Models
First, in response to the rising momentum of the disability-rights movement
in the 1970s, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Commission on Mental and
Physical Disability Law undertook an ambitious project to propose state-law
reforms. In 1982, this project, christened the Developmental Disabilities State
Legislative Project, advocated for the repeal of existing status-based
disenfranchisement provisions, finding them to be likely unconstitutional. 146 For
states that wished to exclude incompetent voters from the electorate, the Project
recommended replacing the existing provisions with a universal, objective test,
under which "[a]ny person who is able to provide the information, whether
orally, in writing, through an interpreter or interpretive device or otherwise,
which is reasonably required of all persons seeking to register to vote, shall be
considered a qualified voter of this state and shall be registered to vote[.]" 4 7
However, critics viewed this standard as insufficient and simplistic. After
all, basic information such as name, address, and age could potentially be
memorized by someone lacking the capacity to rationally choose between
candidates or ballot measures. 148 Voters suffering from Alzheimer's disease or
other progressive cognitive impairments may have no trouble remembering this
sort of information but a great deal of trouble making rational political
decisions.1 49 Simply put, "the ability to provide one's name and address does not
speak directly to the task that a voter will undertake in the voting booth."'
Two propositions for a more relevant assessment model emerged from the
McGeorge School of Law's 2007 symposium on Facilitating Voting as People
Age: Implications of Cognitive Impairment.' The symposium's resolution,
endorsed by the ABA's Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law and
its House of Delegates,' 52 urged states to affirmatively codify a status-blind
presumption of capacity to vote, in deference to principles of democracy: "To
promote the democratic process to the fullest extent possible, no governmental
entity should exclude any otherwise qualified persons from voting on the basis of
medical diagnosis, disability status, or type of residence. A person's capacity to
146. Bindel, supra note 59, at 124-25.
147. BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
111 (1982).
148. Bindel, supra note 59, at 128.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Karlawish et al., supra note 13, at 1346).
151. Symposium, supra note 19.
152. Bindel, supra note 59, at 129.
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vote should be presumed regardless of guardianship status."l53 Exclusion on the
basis of capacity was allowed only when accompanied by due process
protections, including individualized determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction and a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard.154
The symposium endorsed a functional capacity definition (for those states
that elect to retain a capacity standard), allowing exclusion only for people
lacking the ability to "communicate, with or without accommodations, a specific
desire to participate in the voting process."i"s Although this, too, is a low bar,
expression of a desire to vote conveys a degree of understanding of the process
and is arguably more relevant to the democratic endeavor than provision of name
and address. California has recently adopted this standard. Although its state
constitution allows "disqualification of electors while mentally incompetent,"'56
its statutory election code now presumes every voter to be competent unless,
during conservatorship proceedings, the court finds lack of capacity using the
symposium's substantive and evidentiary standards."'
However, two symposium participants refused to take the resolution's
capacity standard at face value. According to Sally Burch Hurme and Paul
Appelbaum, if the sole criterion for voting is the ability to respond "affirmatively
to a query as to whether the person wants to vote . . . no meaningful capacity
requirement would have been established.""' A person with dementia who has
little comprehension of political issues may very well respond affirmatively
without understanding the question.159 Rather than reject the resolution, though,
Hurme and Appelbaum interpreted it in accordance with a more rigorous
assessment model, first promoted by Appelbaum and two colleagues in The
American Journal ofPsychiatry in 2005.160
This model, the "Competence Assessment Tool for Voting" (CAT-V) is
founded upon the competence definition enunciated in the Washington state
statute and the Rowe ruling: ability to understand "the nature and effect of voting
such that she or he [can] make an individual choice." 1 6 ' Hurme and Appelbaum
explain that understanding nature and effect is more meaningful than expression
of a desire to vote, and yet is also a significantly lower bar than the usual four-
153. Recommendations of the Symposium, 38 MCGEORGE L. REv. 861, 862-63 (2007).
154. Id. at 863.
155. Id.
156. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4.
157. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2208(a) (Deering 2016).
158. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 966 n.209.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 967 n.210. For the American Journal of Psychiatry article, see Appelbaum et al.,
supra note 19.
161. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.010(5) (2017); see also Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at
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part capacity standard for medical decision making.' 6 2 This lower bar is amply
justified by the special nature of the right to vote and the miniscule likelihood
that enfranchisement of some incompetent voters will actually harm the quality
of elections. In other words, the concern of over-enfranchisement calls for a
meaningful, functional capacity standard, but the more powerful concern of
under-enfranchisement dictates that this standard be easily met.i6 3
Hurme and Appelbaum read this definition into the "specific desire to
participate in the voting process" standard endorsed by the symposium
Recommendations. "To have a specific desire to participate in a process implies
knowledge of the nature and purpose of the process, as well as an intentional
choice to participate."'" If the voter does not understand the relationship between
her vote and the election of a president, mayor, or other elected official, her
desire to vote does not translate into a genuine desire to participate in this specific
process.' 65
CAT-V "operationalizes" the Doe/Washington standard into a fixed system
of questions and scoring. First, the would-be voter is asked a question about the'.
nature of voting: "Imagine that two candidates are running for Governor of
[subject's state], and that today is Election Day . . . What will the people of
[subject's state] do today to pick the next Governor?"'6 6 Completely correct
responses (e.g., "They will go to the polls and vote") receive two points,
ambiguous responses (e.g., "That's why we have Election Day") receive one
point, and incorrect responses (e.g., "There's nothing you can do; the TV guy
decides") receive zero.'6 Next, the voter's understanding of the effect of voting
is assessed: "When the election for governor is over, how will it be decided who
the winner is?"' 68 Again, correct responses (e.g., "The votes will be counted and
the person with more votes will be the winner") receive two points, ambiguous
responses (e.g., "By the numbers") receive one, and incorrect responses (e.g., "It
all depends which sign they were born under") receive zero.' 6 9
The subject's capacity to choose between candidates is tested by providing
the subject with a hypothetical about two candidates and their opposing
platforms. The subject is asked to choose between two candidates. Clear
indication of a choice receives two points, an ambiguous response (e.g., "I think I
162. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 965. The authors identify the four parts of the
medical standard as "substantial abilities to understand, appreciate, reason, and choose." For a
broader presentation of the law of capacity determinations and the place of voting capacity within
that field, see id at 962-66.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 966 n.209.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 967.
167. Id.
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might go for the guy who doesn't like taxes, but I'm not sure because schools are
important too") receives one, and total lack of a choice (e.g., "I don't know")
receives zero. 170
Hurme and Appelbaum did not take the position that any particular score
from 0 to 6 represents minimum capacity for voting. Instead, they caution against
drawing a firm capacity line among the possible scores and suggest that different
decision-makers may use CAT-V data differently.171
The initial American Journal of Psychiatry study assessed thirty-three
people with Alzheimer's disease. 172 Only four subjects (12%) failed to indicate a
choice, but a greater number failed to understand the nature (fifteen subjects, or
45%) and/or effect (ten subjects, or 30%) of voting.'73 CAT-V performance
correlated strongly with the severity of the subject's dementia, while expression
of desire to vote-the alternative interpretation of the symposium's resolution-
was not a good predictor of CAT-V performance. 17 4
Subsequently, CAT-V has continued to attract interest among scientific
researchers, who have tested its application to aging people with and without
dementia,'75 as well as to psychiatric outpatients with serious mental illness.1 6
Most of these studies supplemented the basic Doe/Washington criteria with
additional questions to assess subjects' appreciation of the effect of voting and
their reasoning underlying electoral choice.177  Some researchers found that
capacity to vote, as measured by CAT-V, does not correlate strongly with
common measures of cognitive function,"' lending scientific support to the
170. Id. at 968-69.
171. Id. at 973 ("So long as a CAT-V score in itself is not the ultimate determinant of whether a
person can vote, but merely triggers a referral of the question to a neutral decision-maker . . . a
screening instrument would appear to play a helpful role."); id at 971 ("To the extent that there is
disagreement over a person's capacity to vote, the argument will turn on the interpretation of a
common set of data .... ).
172. Appelbaum et al., supra note 19, at 2096.
17 3. Id
174. Id. at 2096-97.
175. See Luis Javier Irastorza et al., Capacity to Vote in Persons with Dementia and the Elderly,
2011 INT'L J. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 1 (2011), https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijad/2011/941041
[https://perma.cc/3RW6-DG82]; Pietro Tiraboschi et al., Evaluating Voting Competence in Persons
with Alzheimer's Disease, 2011 INT'L J. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 1 (2011),
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijad/2011/983895 [https://perma.cc/CT5E-NJCF].
176. See Adiel Doron et al., Voting Rights for Psychiatric Patients: Compromise of the Integrity
of Elections, or Empowerment and Integration into the Community?, 51 IS. J. PSYCHIATRY &
RELATED Scis. 169 (2014) (studying psychiatric inpatients); Raymond Raad et al., The Capacity to
Vote of Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 624 (2009) (studying
psychiatric patients residing in the community).
177. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 19, at 2095; Irastorza et al., supra note 175, at *2; Raad et
al., supra note 176, at 625; Tiraboschi et al., supra note 175, at *2. But see Doron et al., supra note
176, at 172 (limiting the CAT-V component of study to assessment of understanding of nature and
effect of voting).
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contention that status-based disenfranchisement provisions are too broad.179 in
the same vein, all the studies that considered CAT-V recommended its usage,
either for people with moderate Alzheimer's disease or for people with legal
guardians.s 0
Demonstrating awareness of public policy concerns, some researchers noted
that CAT-V studies of people without Alzheimer's disease or mental illness
could help establish a capacity cutoff. Rather than arbitrarily choosing an
intermediate CAT-V score as the cutoff, legislators can base their judgment on
the range of scores attained by presumptively competent voters."' Nonetheless,
the CAT-V procedure has apparently not been adopted into electoral law.'82
Undoubtedly, a major reason for the staying power of status-based
disenfranchisement is "the simple belief that the [capacity-based] standards that
have been produced thus far . . . have been fundamentally too relaxed."' 83
Assessments of ability to answer basic questions about the working of an election
have not placated concerns over the quality and integrity of the vote. For this
reason, Benjamin 0. Hoerner has proposed the following hybrid standard: A state
may legislate categorical disenfranchisement of all people under guardianship,
but provide notice during guardianship proceedings of the ward's right to seek
retention of suffrage via assessment of his or her voting capacity. The ward
would have to undergo a court-administered capacity assessment designed to
persons with serious mental illness do not manifest a substantial incidence of incapacity to vote.");
Tiraboschi et al. supra note 175, at *5 ("[G]lobal measures of cognitive functioning ... do not
appear to be strong predictors of the capacity to vote."). But see Doron et al., supra note 176, at 174
("Contrary to Raad et al., who did not find a significant correlation between CAT-V scores and
cognition, we found a positive correlation between cognition and capacity to vote. In addition,
patients with legal guardians performed worse than those without guardians." (footnote omitted)).
179. For this contention, see supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
180. Some researchers found that people with mild Alzheimer's disease can be presumed
competent and those with severe Alzheimer's disease can be presumed incompetent, but that people
with moderate Alzheimer's disease cannot be presumed one way or the other and could be assessed
using CAT-V. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 19, at 2098-99; see also Irastorza et al., supra note
175, at *5 (recommending that CAT-V's choice assessment be made stronger by adding more
information to the hypothetical choice question); Tiraboschi et al., supra note 175, at *5. Others
recommended CAT-V usage for people whose capacity to vote is questioned (a helpful proxy for
identifying people with questionable decision-making capacity). See Doron et al., supra note 176,
at 174 (advocating CAT-V screening for individuals with a legal guardian); Raad et al., supra note
176, at 628.
181. Appelbaum et al., supra note 19, at 2098 (noting it could be helpful to have CAT-V studies
of non-demented people for the purpose of establishing a cutoff); Raad et al., supra note 176, at
628 (urging CAT-V studies of people without mental illness, for the same purpose).
182. This author has not found any evidence of CAT-V's implementation into electoral law.
Although no published sources state explicitly that CAT-V is not legally codified in any
jurisdiction, some writers have suggested their own inability to find evidence of its implementation.
See Beckman, supra note 1, at 229 (noting the CAT-V test "is not yet generally adopted"); Hoerner,
supra note 12, at 127 (noting the CAT-V standards "have been largely ignored by both the [U.S.]
federal government and the states").
183. Hoerner, supra note 12, at 127.
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gauge his or her understanding of the voting process. Such a compromise would
help placate electoral-integrity concerns by creating a hurdle for people under
guardianship, but would also move away from over-exclusion and discrimination
by providing notice and an opportunity to be enfranchised on capacity grounds. 18 4
B. The Arbitrariness of Capacity Determinations
Alternatively, the failure of capacity-based standards to gain legislative
traction may stem from a more essential problem. Drawing a legal voting-
capacity line is "an exercise in policy, not science."' The best that assessment
models could do is to illustrate a spectrum of capacity; translating this spectrum
into distinct categories of competent and incompetent voters is a fundamentally
arbitrary task. In contrast, statuses such as intellectual disability, mental illness,
and guardianship are rooted in preexisting categories of law and science.
Disenfranchisement of these well-defined "other" groups is more intuitive and
more politically palatable than rearrangement of civil rights along the lines of
newly constructed "capacity" categories.
Accordingly, status-based disenfranchisement remains on the books, 18 6 and,
as will be shown below, even CAT-V, the gold standard for capacity assessment,
fails to disregard status entirely. Moreover, as of the date of this writing, no
electoral democracies have instituted universal cognitive capacity assessment as
a prerequisite for voting." The following section argues that, because political
considerations favor focusing upon recognized statuses, scholars and legislators
promoting the capacity assessment idea are unlikely to embrace objective
assessment of all potential voters.
The ABA and McGeorge universal-capacity-screening proposals were
shelved by Hurme and Appelbaum for their failure to sufficiently protect the
electorate from incompetent voters,18' and the more rigorous CAT-V standard
has emerged as the favored capacity assessment mechanism in many subsequent
analyses.189 However, CAT-V assessment does not appear to have been seriously
considered as a universal prerequisite for the franchise. Hurme and Appelbaum
disapproved of such "indiscriminate screening" out of concern that it "may result
184. Id. at 127-29. Hoemer also notes that such a hybrid standard would meet the Due Process
requirements announced in Rowe and Carnahan. Id. at 127-28.
185. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 962.
186. See supra Introduction.
187. For a survey of relevant electoral laws worldwide and in the United States, see supra
Introduction.
188. See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text (describing the concerns of Hurme &
Appelbaum).
189. See, e.g., Barclay, supra note 103, at 152; Beckman, supra note 1, at 229-30; Kelley, supra
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in the disenfranchisement of the elderly in general."'" The scientific studies of
CAT-V considered only members of status groups (people with mental illness or
Alzheimer's disease) and recommended CAT-V usage only for members of
status groups (people with moderate Alzheimer's disease or under
guardianship)."' Some have recommended studying CAT-V performance in the
general population, but only for the purpose of discerning a capacity cutoff line
to be used in screening certain status groups. 192
It may seem strange that the same scholars who advocate the relative
desirability of capacity-based determinations would shy away from universal
capacity screening out of fear that it would be taken too seriously and result in
the disenfranchisement of people who are now permitted to vote. It may also
seem strange that these scholars retain a discriminatory focus upon status groups
by proposing to screen only members of such groups. Ludvig Beckman was
troubled by this:
The rationale for restricting the vote on the basis of capacity to vote is
that people should not be disenfranchised simply because of their
cognitive status. But the decision to test for capacity to vote is plausible
only on the suspicion that people with a certain cognitive status may not
be in possession of the capacity to vote. Hence, CAT-V testing is
premised on the tenet that only people with some cognitive impairment
should be tested. But once this is admitted, the problem of
misclassification re-emerges . . . In the end, people denied the vote
following a failed result on tests for capacity to vote are denied the vote
also because . . . of their cognitive status.193
In international legal terms, singling out certain status groups for screening
is likely prohibited under Article 12.2 of the CRPD, which declares that "persons
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects
of life." As Oliver Lewis of the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre argued
before the Venice Commission,
Given that it is only people with actual or perceived mental or cognitive
disabilities who will be subjected to the [capacity assessment] in the first place, it
does not matter whether the word "disabled" appears in the [assessment] or not.
No matter how elegant the legal formulation, and no matter whether it is
legislation or a judge which removes the franchise, these measures will still
constitute unlawful discrimination.
If I were legal counsel to the Venice Commission I would be advising you
190. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 95, at 971.
191. See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (describing the recommendations).
192. See id.
193. Beckman, supra note 1, at 230.
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that the only way for a "proper judgment" to be non-discriminatory is for the test
to be administered to people with disabilities and all other potential voters. As far
as I know this proposal is-unsurprisingly-not on the table.1 94
What, then, has the voting-rights debate gained from the pivot from status
toward capacity? It seems that even the most celebrated capacity-based proposal
is equally discriminatory, equally arbitrary, and equally illegal to the existing
status-based provisions." Linda Barclay has argued that the small benefits to be
gained from conducting a capacity-screening test on every voter do not justify the
immense monetary and social costs of the screening process.19 6 She proceeded to
argue that the same logic applies to capacity screening of suspect groups and, in
its place, proposed elimination of all mental impairment-based suffrage
restrictions.1 9 7
As illustrated above, pragmatic politics help to explain the capacity
advocates' retention of status-based discrimination. The scholars who created and
promoted CAT-V want their ideas to be acceptable to policymakers and voters. A
universal screening scheme that rearranges the fundamentals of citizenship and
potentially disenfranchises large numbers of people is bound to be an unpopular
proposition. Just as some have proposed a compromise that combines capacity
screening with preliminary categorical disenfranchisement of people under
guardianship, 9 8 the CAT-V scheme apparently has a built-in compromise leaving
alone the masses of presumptively rational voters. This may also be the import of
194. Oliver Lewis, Exec. Dir., Mental Disability Advocacy Ctr., The Promise of Democracy-
Why the Venice Commission Should Adopt Universal Suffrage for People with Disabilities 3 (June
18, 2011), http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/The%20Promise%200f%2Democracy/`20%E2
%80%93%2OWhy/o20the%20Venice%20Commission%20should%20adopt%2Ouniversal%20suffr
age%20for/o20people%20with%20disabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LEU-FT58]. Linda Barclay
contested Lewis's claim that capacity screening members of certain status groups is discriminatory,
on several grounds: (a) Since capacity-screening seeks to hold people with mental impairments to
the same competence standard as other people, rather than to a higher standard, they are not
actually discriminated against in any appreciable way; (b) even if differential treatment-namely
screening-itself constitutes discrimination, it is done on the basis of a morally relevant
difference-namely capacity-and is therefore justifiable; (c) Lewis' notion of discrimination is
detrimental to the disability-rights movement, because it holds the provision of special resources to
people with disabilities-a form of differential treatment-to be per se discriminatory; and (d)
Lewis' notion of discrimination is also detrimental to the universal enfranchisement cause in
particular, because it requires acceptance of the much-less-popular contentions that children should
be enfranchised without capacity screening, and people with mental impairments should not be
subjected to capacity screening with regard to medical and financial decision making. Barclay,
supra note 103, at 152-53.
195. For arguments that status-based disenfranchisement of people with mental impairments is
discriminatory and arbitrary, see supra Part I.C. For authority stating that such disenfranchisement
violates U.S. constitutional law, see discussion of the Doe v. Rowe case, supra Part I.A. For
authority stating that such disenfranchisement violates international-human-rights law, see
discussion of CRPD Article 29 and related case law, supra Part I.B.
196. Barclay, supra note 103, at 153-54.
197. Id. at 154-57.
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Beckman's contention that "the decision to test for capacity to vote is plausible
only on the suspicion that people with a certain cognitive status may not be in
possession of the capacity to vote."'99 The concern is political, rather than
theoretical, plausibility.
The proponents of capacity assessment have therefore not succeeded in
eliminating traditional barriers to suffrage. And even if the political concerns
were overcome and universal capacity assessment were instituted, the upshot
would be to preserve the exclusivity of the electorate by evolving traditional
barriers to meet modern standards of law and justice-capacity rather than status.
Meanwhile, another recent reform proposal has sought to radically expand the
boundaries of the electorate, making it far more inclusive of people with mental
impairments than it has ever been. This idea, popularized by philosopher Martha
Nussbaum in 2009, is the subject of Part IV. 200
III. VOTING BY PROXY
Nussbaum's analysis began with the contention that, with regard to "core
political entitlements" such as the right to vote, "adequacy of capability requires
equality of capability." 20 ' If voting rights are not possessed by all citizens of the
demos on the basis of total equality-if, for instance, the vote of each black
citizen is worth half the vote of each white citizen-the system is ftmdamentally
unjust, despite the fact that all adult citizens have some right to vote. No
arrangement short of equality is adequate. 202
Nussbaum then applied this model to the question of suffrage for people
with mental impairments. She conceptualized this question into three cases: In
Case A, a person is cognitively capable of voting, but has difficulty doing so
alone on account of some disability, such as social anxiety or limited literacy. To
ensure equal rights for such a person, society must spend "the money required to
facilitate that person's full inclusion in . .. voting."203 In Case B, a person cannot
vote even with facilitation, but can make an electoral choice and convey it to his
or her guardian. To ensure equal rights, society must allow that person's guardian
to cast a vote based on the person's expressed preference. 20 In Case C, "the
person's disability is so profound that he or she is unable to perform the function
in question, even to the extent of forming a view and communicating that view to
a guardian."205 Nussbaum argues that the person's guardian should be allowed to
199. See Beckman, supra note 1, at 230 (emphasis added).
200. Nussbaum, supra note 17.
201. Id. at 343.
202. Id. Nussbaum's analysis also concerns jury service, but this Note will focus on her
contentions regarding voting.
203. Id. at 345.
204. Id. at 346.
205. Id. at 345.
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cast a vote "on the person's behalf and in her interests, just as guardians currently
represent people with cognitive disabilities in areas such as property rights and
contract."206 Arguably, this contention is the logical conclusion of the analogy
between the rules of the "social contract" of voting and the rules of ordinary
commercial contracts, invoked above to justify exclusion of people with mental
impairments from the electorate.207 According to Nussbaum, nothing short of
voting by proxy ensures equal voting rights for every person with mental
unpairments.
As to the concern that guardians may usurp their wards' votes to vote twice
for their own preferences, Nussbaum contends that this problem is equally
applicable to any function of guardianship. Just as some bad guardians will insert
their own interests into their wards' health and contract decisions, some will do
so for voting as well. "Instead, we [should] design procedures to authorize
guardianship that try to weed out the incompetent or the selfish."208 After briefly
musing on the slim chance of the Case C voting right being recognized in U.S.
courts, Nussbaum closes with a recognition of the firestorm she would soon
engender: "Let the debate begin."209
The proxy voting idea had been previously, if very briefly, considered in a
2004 Journal of the American Medical Association article.210 The nine authors
rejected the idea with an uncited assertion that:
Unlike medical and financial decisions, the act of voting in a democratic
polity is an incident of citizenship and an inalienable right. Citizenship
creates certain obligations and opportunities that cannot be delegated,
such submitting to a military draft or serving on a jury. Although a
person has the prerogative to vote as another person recommends, the
person cannot "assign" his or her right to vote to someone else.21 '
That these authors gave the proxy voting idea such short shrift lends
credence to Nussbaum's assertion that she, by seriously considering the merits of
the issue, was beginning a new debate. As predicted, her 2009 proposition
received many vehement responses,212 and the exchange has helped develop
contemporary approaches to the problem of suffrage for people with severe
206. Id. at 347.
207. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
208. Nussbaum, supra note 17, at 348.
209. Id. at 350.
210. Karlawish et al., supra note 13.
211. Id. at 1347.
212. These responses will be considered at great length below. Benajmin 0. Hoerner has
responded more ambivalently, calling Nussbaum's proposition "too large of a legislative leap" on





Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol17/iss1/4
SUFFRAGE, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS
mental impairments. The remainder of this section will review two important
responses to Nussbaum and offer one original response.
Claudio L6pez-Guerra argues that right to vote should depend on interest "in
the value of the franchise."213 Appointing proxy voters for fully competent people
would not satisfy their interest in the franchise because "they understand and
value the . . . opportunity to contribute to the making of a more just society
through the election of the right kind of representatives."2 14 In contrast, people
with severe mental impairments, who do not understand or value this
opportunity, correspondingly do not have the requisite interest in the franchise to
justify receiving any right to vote, through proxy or otherwise.2 15
In the international human rights law analysis considered in Part II.B.,216 the
three Harvard authors raise four objections to Nussbaum's proposition. First, they
argue that proxy voting violates core human-rights norms of "autonomy, dignity,
and respect for the individual-precisely, and ironically, the values [Nussbaum]
seeks to honor."2 17 More particularly, the prevalence of substituted decision-
making models for people with disabilities was a major impetus for the adoption
of the CRPD. Article 12 of the CRPD guarantees people with disabilities "legal
capacity on an equal basis with others" and commits states parties to facilitate
free exercise of this capacity-the so-called "supported decisionmaking"
model.218
Second, voting by proxy does not promote the dignity of people with mental
impairments. Far from engendering social inclusion, this scheme holds no
therapeutic value for the person uninvolved in casting his or her own vote,2 19 and
is likely to perpetuate the societal stigma of people with mental impairments as
flawed and incapable. And since Nussbaum's "Case C" voters are a small
minority, proxy voting on their behalf is unlikely to have a significant impact on
advancing their policy preferences.2 20
Third, the process of identifying the people whose voting rights should be
assigned to proxies is likely to suffer from the same vagueness problems that
plague mental-impairment-based suffrage restrictions. People unjustly included
in this class will simply lose their right to vote and see it pass to fellow
citizens.2 21
213. L6PEZ-GUERRA, supra note 103, at 73.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18.
217. Id. at 99.
218. Id.
219. For more on voting as a means of social inclusion and therapy, see supra notes 123-124
and accompanying text.
220. Fiala-Butora et al., supra note 18, at 101.
221. Id. at 102.
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Fourth, as Nussbaum herself noted, the potential for abusive vote usurpation
is clear. Contrary to Nussbaum's assertion, though, voting by proxy presents a
greater opportunity for the guardian to substitute her own interests than do
medical and financial decisions. Voting, unlike those other contexts, is done in
secret, thus shielding the guardian's decision and the process by which she
reached it from outside oversight.222 Finally, governments with an instrumentalist
view of the value of voting "would have a strong incentive to subject
increasingly more persons to proxy voting because they consider guardians better
educated and more knowledgeable than voters with disabilities. 223 in this way,
Nussbaum's proposition for greater inclusion can be utilized as a tool to further
the disenfranchisement rationales explored above.224
But Nussbaum's proposal suffers from an essential flaw, in addition to the
valid problems raised by L6pez-Guerra and the international law scholars: The
decision of which candidates and which referenda to support depends on much
more than a calculation of personal interests. When citizens vote, they are called
upon not only to protect their own economic and physiological welfare, but to
advocate for their vision of the proper course of society in terms of war and
peace, social policy, and the economy. To suggest that a guardian-no matter
how familiar and caring she may be-can fairly express another person's
political view trivializes both the nature (ideological, rather than mathematical)
and the effect (upon all of society, not just the self) of voting. No personal-
interests-based determination can fairly approximate someone else's vision for
society at large. Instead, in the absence of a clear indication as to the ward's
political preference, many guardians will inevitably substitute their own
preferences.
Because Nussbaum's proposal would transform the purpose of voting from
civic duty to economic self-interest, it must not be adopted into law. And because
the potential for guardians to vote their own preferences would raise familiar
fears of vote misappropriation, 2 5 this proposal is not likely to find widespread
acceptance in any electoral democracy.
Both Nussbaum and the advocates of capacity assessment have sought to
revolutionize the subject of voting capacity. The advocates of assessment take a
more conservative approach, acknowledging that people need a minimum
222. Id. The impact upon the ward of an improper medical or financial decision is arguably
greater than the impact of an improperly cast vote. Nonetheless, the Harvard authors do not address
this differential of impact and instead focus squarely on the question of opportunity. From their
perspective, "the situation is more serious in the case of voting," because there is a greater
opportunity for abuse in this case than there is in the case of other guardian-made decisions. Fiala-
Butora, supra note 18, at 102.
223. Id. at 103.
224. Id. For the rationales, see supra Part I.C.
225. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing the concern of vote misappropriation and reviewing
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cognitive capacity to participate in the democratic process, but arguing that that
capacity must be defined and assessed in an objective, scientifically precise way.
Nussbaum, on the other hand, contends that voting capacity is transferable; all
people have a right to participate in self-government, and when capacity to do so
is lacking, it may simply be supplied by proxy. Parts II and III have reviewed
these two ideas, arguing that both are flawed and unlikely to achieve political
acceptance. Still, both ideas are correct in their insistence that voting regulations
across the world exclude too many people who are ready and able to contribute to
the democratic process.
Part IV will advance a new proposal for reforming legal conceptions of
voting capacity: removal of mental illness as a factor for disenfranchisement.
This idea is admittedly only a first step and not an attempt to perfect the rules of
voting. Still, it will address a basic problem that permeates the existing law and
scholarship on voting capacity. Treating mental illness as a marker of incapacity
both misunderstands the nature of mental illness and makes the democratic
process into an instrument of stigmatization.
IV. DISENFRANCHISEMENT ON THE BASIS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
The Rowe case sheds light on the absurdity of disenfranchisement provisions
founded upon mental illness. Two of the plaintiffs in that case had been placed
under guardianship on account of their bipolar disorder, and the third on account
of intermittent explosive disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and mild
organic brain syndrome.22 6 That their mood, personality, and behavior disorders
had little bearing on the plaintiffs' ability to understand and rationally participate
in voting is amply clear from the record. Evidence showed that all three women
fully understood the nature and effect of voting and were capable of making an
informed choice; two of them had previously voted on their own initiative before
learning that the Maine Constitution prohibited them from doing so.2 2 7
As mentioned above, multiple studies have shown that the voting behavior
of psychiatric inpatients closely mirrors the votes of the patients' communities
and socioeconomic strata.228 Although these data do not prove that the psychiatric
inpatient voters engaged in rational consideration of the options, the similarity of
their voting pattern to those of other citizens "tend[s] to refute" the presumption
that people with mental illnesses are, as a group, less competent to vote than
other people.229 As one 1970 study explained:
226. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39-41 (D. Me. 2001).
227. Id.
228. See supra note 113.
229. Klein & Grossman, supra note 113, at 1565; see also Howard & Anthony, supra note 113,
at 132 ("[T]his study seems to clearly support the premise that the hospitalized mental patient is
competent to vote and is capable of doing so in an informed and thoughtful manner.").
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Disenfranchisement of mental patients is based on the assumption that
mental illness is synonymous with mental incompetence and that such
incompetence is all-pervasive and covers all phases of human activity..
. [The findings show that w]hile people may at times manifest
dysfunction in one area of activity, they may still be competent in other
areas. 230
Nonetheless, electoral laws around the world and related scholarship
continue to treat "mental illness" as a significant factor vis-A-vis voting capacity.
Although no U.S. states still disenfranchise people for reasons of mental
illness, 23 1 still, as noted above, 23 2 sixty nine U.N. member states disenfranchise
all people "with any mental health problems . . . without any qualifier," 233 nine
member states disenfranchise people detained under mental health laws, 234 and
fifty six member states authorize courts or magistrates to disenfranchise people
for mental health reasons.2 35
Moreover, at least two of the recent published studies to apply the CAT-V
assessment method focused upon mental illness, one assessing the CAT-V scores
of "persons with serious mental illness" and one assessing the scores of
"psychiatric patients." 236 These researchers, seeking subject populations with
questionable voting capacity, draw no distinction between illnesses known to
affect cognition and illnesses not known to do so. This phenomenon suggests that
even mental-health scientists continue to view mental illness as an indicator of
impaired voting capacity.2 37
This Part argues that considering mental illness when determining voting
capacity turns electoral law into an instrument of stigmatization and
disempowerment. Framing this point, however, requires some background on the
definition of the term "mental illness." For half a century, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and philosophers have disputed the proper definition of this term.238
230. Klein & Grossman, supra note 113, at 1565.
231. See BAZELON CTR., supra note 8, at 28-52 (detailing the relevant electoral law in U.S.
states and territories). Maine's constitution still disenfranchises people "under guardianship for
reason of mental illness," the state no longer enforces the provision, in compliance with Rowe. See
supra Part I.A.
232. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying -text.
233. Bhugra et al., supra note 3, at 396.
234. Id. at 396-97. Twelve other member states disenfranchise all detained people, a group that
presumably includes people detained for mental-health reasons but does not target them
specifically. Id.
235. Id. at 396.
236. See supra note 176.
237. For an illustration of the CAT-V researchers' focus on subjects with mental illness, see the
studies described in supra page 295 and notes 177-78.
238. For two overviews of the history of this dispute, see, for example, Valerie Aucouturier &
Steeves Demazeux, The Concept of Mental Disorder, in HEALTH, ILLNESS AND DISEASE:
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The subject has been very contentious, and an exhaustive treatment of the dispute
is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, the following paragraphs will briefly
introduce some of the most important events, positions, and currents of the
dispute.
First, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz declared war on the field of psychiatry in
1960 by questioning the reality of the concept of mental illness. He wrote:
The concept of illness, whether bodily or mental, implies deviation from
some clearly defined norm. In the case of physical illness, the norm is
the structural and functional integrity of the human body. . . . What is
the norm deviation from which is regarded as mental illness? This
question cannot be easily answered. But whatever this norm might be,
we can be certain of only one thing: namely, that it is a norm that must
be stated in terms of psycho-social, ethical, and legal concepts. For
example, notions such as "excessive repression" or "acting out an
unconscious impulse" illustrate the use of psychological concepts for
judging (so-called) mental health and illness. The idea that chronic
hostility, vengefulness, or divorce are indicative of mental illness would
be illustrations of the use of ethical norms (that is, the desirability of
love, kindness, and a stable marriage relationship). Finally, the
widespread psychiatric opinion that only a mentally ill person would
commit homicide illustrates the use of a legal concept as a norm of
mental health.239
Szasz's claim that the concept of mental illness draws upon values external
to medicine has become emblematic of the anti-psychiatry movement, and it
inspired attempts by others in the field to more precisely define, and defend, the
term.2 40 Another catalyzing event in this debate was the American Psychiatric
Association's 1973 decision to remove homosexuality from its Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which it made in response to a
shift in popular attitudes toward homosexuality.24 1
Throughout the 1970s, mental health researchers sought to identify objective
Function Debate and the Concept of Mental Disorder, in CLASSIFICATION, DISEASE, AND EVIDENCE:
NEw ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE 63 (Philippe Huneman et al. eds., 2015).
239. Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 113, 114 (1960); see
also THOMAS S. SZAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (revised ed., 1974) (expounding further
upon the position announced in his 1960 article).
240. Aucouturier & Demazeux, supra note 238, at 83-84; Demazeux, supra note 238, at 65.
241. Aucouturier & Demazeux, supra note 238, at 84-85; see also Neel Burton, When
Homosexuality Stopped Being a Mental Disorder, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201509/when-homosexuality-stopped-
being-mental-disorder [https://perma.cc/Z225-DFGG] ("The evolution of the status of
homosexuality in the classifications of mental disorders highlights that concepts of mental disorder
can be rapidly evolving social constructs that change as society changes.").
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criteria for the concept of mental illness. Robert Spitzer and Jean Endicott
emphasized suffering and distress, while Donald Klein insisted on the necessity
of "actual dysfunction."242 In a series of influential articles in the 1990s, Jerome
Wakefield advocated a middle position: mental illness is characterized by
"harmful dysfunction": "dysfunction" refers to a person's objective mental
abnormality, but the abnormality is only considered "harmful" on the basis of
subjective sociocultural values. In Wakefield's view, then, the concept of mental
illness includes both an objective scientific element and a subjective value-laden
one.
24 3
This Note takes no position in this debate. However, it is very significant
that recent literature reviewing the debate highlights the continuing prevalence of
the idea, including among psychiatrists themselves, that "psycho-social, ethical,
and legal values play a role in the classification of mental illnesses. Indeed, some
writers now consider it a matter of "consensus" that mental illness is a value-
laden concept. 2"
Accepting this "consensus" idea as true, even if just for the sake of
argument, reveals a stunning problem in the use of mental illness as an indicator
of voting incapacity. If diagnoses of mental illness inevitably incorporate
elements of psychosocial, ethical, or legal disapproval, then disenfranchisement
on the basis of mental illness reinforces that disapproval by excluding the voices
of the marginalized group from the democratic process. This exclusion thereby
inhibits the ability of people with mental illness to change social attitudes
through the democratic process.
Government initiatives to reform psychiatric-care practices in Australia and
the United States have noted the importance of political engagement by
consumers/survivors of the psychiatric system to argue for change.2 45 There is no
242. Aucouturier & Demazeux, supra note 238, at 86-88.
243. See Jerome C. Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A Conceptual Critique of
DSM-III-R's Definition of Mental Disorder, 99 PSYCHOL. REv. 232 (1992); Jerome C. Wakefield,
Limits of Operationalization: A Critique of Spitzer and Endicott's (1978) Proposed Operational
Criteria for Mental Disorder, 102 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 160 (1993); Jerome C. Wakefield, The
Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary Between Biological Facts and Social Values, 47
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 373 (1992).
244. See, e.g., RACHEL COOPER, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY 42 (2007)
(concluding that "there is a general consensus that diseases are necessarily harmful conditions"); id.
at 33 (using "harmful" in the same sense as Wakefield to refer to social difficulty); Aucouturier &
Demazeux, supra note 238, at 91 ("Nowadays, if any general consensus has been reached on the
concept of mental disorder, it is clearly in the sense of a general recognition that it is a value-laden
concept.").
245. See, e.g., A National Framework for Recovery-Oriented Mental Health Services: Guide for
Practitioners and Providers, AUSTL. HEALTH MINISTERS' ADVISORY COUNCIL at iii (2013),
https://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/67D I7065514CF8E8CA257C 1 DO
0017A90/$File/recovgde.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMZ3-T7D7] ("There was a terrific response
during the consultations and submissions. The framework has benefited greatly from the wisdom
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reason, then, that people with mental illness should not also use the democratic
process to change conceptions of what is or is not an illness. Just as
homosexuality was considered a mental illness by the APA until 1973 and is
today considered a healthy, normal sexual orientation,246 it is also plausible that
some other tendency now thought of as symptomatic of mental illness will one
day achieve acceptance and respectability. This Note ventures no guess as to
which tendency may undergo such a transformation. Being accustomed to
today's notions of normality and abnormality restricts our ability to imagine an
alternative.
Nevertheless, the possibility that symptoms of mental illness may one day be
seen as normal cautions against disenfranchisement on the basis of mental illness.
Voting is the most basic means of exercising political power; disenfranchisement
on the basis of mental illness inhibits the ability of people to change popular
attitudes and gain societal acceptance. Therefore, even for those electoral regimes
that retain cognitive capacity as a requirement, the status of being mentally ill
must not be considered an indicator of incapacity.
CONCLUSION
Regarding suffrage rights for people with mental impairments, some
scholars have approached the debate from the perspective of law, others have
done so from the perspective of philosophy, and still others from the perspective
of cognitive psychology. Each discipline employs its own specialized language,
but they all share a common objective: finding a way to respect the dignity of all
individuals while ensuring that electoral results are meaningful, legitimate
expressions of democratic self-rule.
This Note has attempted to contribute to the discussion by criticizing two
recent reform proposals and advancing a third. The capacity assessment idea,
which seeks to shed the injustice of status-based disenfranchisement, is not likely
to see political success because voters fear the consequences of radically
redefining cognitive capacity. The proxy voting idea, which seeks to include as
many voters as possible, must be rejected because of the damage it does to the
notion of voting as a civic responsibility; moreover it is not likely to see political
their loved ones. This is their framework. The consultations have made a lasting contribution to the
national dialogue on recovery-oriented practice and this was in evidence during the National
Mental Health Recovery Forum in June 2012, which was an important step in the framework's
progress."); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 92 (Howard H. Goldman et al. eds., 1999) ("Through strong advocacy, consumer and
family organizations have gained a voice in legislation and policy for mental health service
delivery."); see also Nancy Tomes, The Patient as a Policy Factor: A Historical Case Study of the
Consumer/Survivor Movement in Mental Health, 25 HEALTH AFF. 720, 720 (2006) ("Th[el paper
analyzes the history of the modem consumer/survivor movement and its impact on the policy-
making climate in the mental health field.").
246. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (describing the 1973 change).
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success because it raises fears of vote misappropriation. An appropriate
alternative approach would be to fully dissociate mental illness from voting
capacity. Such dissociation would allow all people who are capable of voting to
do so, and would provide an avenue to increase the societal engagement of a
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